su¢ ciently large increases have a crowding-in e¤ect by "jump-starting"competition between retailers for the larger market. Furthermore, asymmetric abilities in such contests can lead the weaker player to e¤ectively drop out of the contest, thereby undermining the ability of increased prizes to increase e¤ort by intensifying competition. More generally the model can be applied to other contests such as patent races or promotion tournaments where not just the probability of winning but also the value of winning depends on contest e¤ort levels. JEL: C72, D72
Introduction
Because retailer advertising has both market share and market size e¤ects, retailers face con‡icting incentives. The market share e¤ect provokes each retailer to out-compete his rivals by advertising more, but the market size e¤ect provides an incentive to free ride on his rival's advertising and advertise less. And if retailers di¤er in their ability to e¤ectively attract customers to their store, how does this asymmetry a¤ect advertising incentives?
Furthermore, how a manufacturer's use of advertising that increases market size a¤ects the trade-o¤ between these con ‡icting incentives, and thereby a¤ects total retailer advertising is also of interest. By "sweetening the pot" does manufacturer advertising intensify market share competition and lead to higher advertising by retailers? Or does it reduce the incentive for retailers to build market size themselves and lead them to free-ride on the manufacturer as well as on each other?
For example, Lowes and Home Depot are retailers who compete in branded hand tools.
Marketing e¤ort by Lowes steals market share away from Home Depot while also expanding the overall branded hand tool market. If Home Depot responds with higher marketing e¤ort to regain market share, Lowes'market share declines, but the size of the market still increases. If the manufacturer of branded hand tools, Black&Decker, promotes their new product through advertising, thereby increasing market demand, will the downstream competing retailers, Home Depot and Lowes, increase their own advertising to take advantage of expanded consumer demand, or will they instead reduce their own advertising and free-ride on Black&Decker? Should Black&Decker's decision and magnitude of advertising depend on the relative asymmetry between the rival retailers? (Advertising Age 2007)
To address these questions and more easily apply the results to other competitive environments, I adopt a contest theory approach. I focus on the contestable market for a product of a single manufacturer. Since retailers consider all elements of the market mix, I use the term advertising interchangeably with marketing e¤ort. Contests usually involve two or more players competing for a prize, where the player exerting the highest e¤ort usually wins the prize. In the advertising game, the market size (i.e., the prize) depends on the total advertising of the retailers and manufacturer, whereas the market share depends only on the relative advertising of the retailers. This increased market size bene…ts both the retailers and the manufacturer through increased unit sales. However, as retailers become asymmetric in advertising e¤ectiveness, retailer competition might weaken, reducing overall advertising and unit sales ( I build on a standard Tullock (1975 Tullock ( , 1980 ratio-form contest model of competition between players. Previous research using contest models of advertising include Friedman (1958) , Bell, Keeny, and Little (1975) , Monahan and Sobel (1994) , and Krishnamurthy (2000) . Following Rosen (1986) , Baik (1994 Baik ( , 2004 and Nitzan (1994) , I depart from the original symmetry assumption in such contests and allow for one player to be stronger than the other, i.e., one of the retailers is more e¤ective in using advertising to attract customers. Furthermore, I follow Chung (1996) and Morgan (2000) , and depart from the assumption that the prize is exogenous and instead assume that the prize is increasing in the e¤ort levels of the players, i.e., the size of the market is increasing in the amount of advertising.
I show that the combination of asymmetric ability and an endogenous prize change two basic results from contests. First, in a standard ratio-form contests for a common-value prize, both players always exert the same e¤ort even for arbitrarily large ability di¤erences. So a weak player will still put forth e¤ort, albeit very small, even though his probability of winning is very small.
The stronger player also competes even though a victory is almost assured. This surprising result is sometimes di¢ cult to accept in application. For example, many elections go unchallenged, markets seem to lack su¢ cient competition, and requests for proposals may attract only one bidder. If instead, the prize is endogenous to e¤ort, I …nd that a su¢ ciently weak player will exert zero e¤ort. Because the prize is increasing in total e¤ort, the stronger player will always want to exert some e¤ort even if the weaker player does not. Anticipating this, and knowing that substantial e¤ort is needed to …ght the stronger player, the weaker player …nds it best to exert no e¤ort. In the advertising application this means that su¢ ciently asymmetric advertising e¤ectiveness of the retailer marketing e¤ort can completely eliminate the competition between retailers.
Second, a marginal increase in the prize o¤ered in a contest normally leads to a proportional increase in e¤ort by contestants, but with asymmetric abilities and an endogenous prize this e¤ect can be reversed. Since the prize is increasing in total e¤ort by the contestants, an exogenous addition to the prize allows the contestants to free-ride on this increase and reduce their own e¤orts. This tradeo¤ between increasing e¤orts in response to an increased prize and decreasing e¤orts in response to free-riding on the additional prize creates tension for the contestants.
Similarly, the contest designer must consider the magnitude and intensity of the prize increase.
In the context of advertising, advertising by the manufacturer …rst leads to a decrease rather than increase in retailer advertising if retailers are su¢ ciently asymmetric. Only if manufacturer advertising is su¢ ciently large to "jump start"competition between the retailers does it lead to an increase in total retailer advertising.
While the model is presented in the context of retailers and a manufacturer, it is easily applicable to other contest environments where players have asymmetric abilities and the prize is an increasing function of total e¤ort. In R&D contests, the probability of an innovation and the value of the innovation is increasing in research e¤ort. The government should consider how promotion contests the probability of advancement is increasing in investment in one's skill, and the value of being promoted is also a positive function of how much skill one has acquired. Here, too, a …rm must consider how asymmetric skill levels can induce some contestants to completely drop out if promotion incentives are not su¢ ciently strong. (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz 1983) In CEO selection, Tsoulouhas, Knoeber, and Agrawal (2007) show that the e¤ort of the internal candidates contributes to the future pro…tability of the …rm, increasing the value of the position. Similarly, the probability of winning a primary election in political contests is increasing in campaign expenditures, and such expenditures also build name recognition of the political party for the general election. The model supports the simple intuition that if primary contestants are su¢ ciently asymmetric then the primary might not be contested at all. to total retailer advertising and is given by f = a W =(a W + a S ). Similarly, the market share of retailer S is simply 1 a W =(a W + a S ). 2 In this way, an increase in a W will increase retailer W 's market share and an increase in a S reduces its market share. Retailer W 's pro…t function is written as
Equation (1) de…nes retailer W 's pro…t where the market size, v, and its market share, a W =(a W +a S ), are dependent on its own advertising. The average cost-per-view of advertising is assumed to be linear and equal to one. Retailer W 's …rst-order condition for pro…t maximization 1 This assumption contrasts with Hirshleifer (1991) where the value of the common prize is increasing in production resources, but decreasing in …ghting resources. Each player in his paper is therefore restricted by a resource endowment budget constraint. Krishnamurthy (2000) is similar in the use of a budget constraint on marketing expenses allocation. Both models examine a tradeo¤ of expenses whereas the current paper only has one expense that is compared to an expected payo¤, and therefore does not have a budget constraint. 2 This us/(us+them) is commonly referred to as the Tullock ratio form speci…cation in contests (but has been utilized as early as Friedman, 1958) and is frequently used in the literature since a pure strategy equilibrium is found as the solution and contains certain axiomatic properties relevant to competitive environments.
is
Equation ( Pro…ts are maximized when the sum of the two e¤ects equal marginal cost. 3 The second-order condition for pro…t maximization is
When retailer W advertises, v expands due to an increase in demand for the product. This market size e¤ect attracts retailer S to advertise more and steal market share away from retailer W .
Recall that retailer S's advertising is also increasing the market size, albeit at a decreasing rate.
This increase in market size, and simultaneous loss of market share, causes retailer W to increase its own advertising even further, and so on. Since v is concave in total advertising, the incremental returns from advertising to both retailers gets smaller. This diminishing marginal bene…t eventually equals the marginal cost of advertising to each retailer in equilibrium. The cross-partial of retailer W 's pro…t functions is
When their advertising expenditures are equal, as in the symmetric equilibrium, only the third term remains. Using the assumptions of v the third term is negative, implying that advertising e¤orts are strategic substitutes, and that an increase in retailer S's advertising will decrease the pro…t maximizing advertising level of retailer W . Since they are symmetric, an increase in retailer W 's advertising will decrease the pro…t maximizing advertising level of retailer S and vice versa. Note that when v is exogenous, only the …rst term remains.
It is standard to …nd the symmetric equilibrium (Chung 1996) where the equilibrium advertising for each retailer in the endogenous prize contest is denoted as a = a W = a S . The size of the market is v (2a ) and is split evenly between the retailers. Recall that retailers advertise to increase market share and market size, but suppose market size was not endogenous to advertising and instead was …xed at v (2a ). The retailers would then only compete for market share, with total advertising of
2 . 4 Because the marginal bene…t of increasing the market size is eliminated (the second term in Equation 2), retailers spend less on advertising and earn higher pro…ts than if the market size were endogenous, shown as
< a . By allowing advertising to also increase the size of the market both retailers will advertise more.
Suppose there were only one retailer in the market, a monopolist, then denote a as the pro…t maximizing advertising amount, such that v 0 (a ) = 1. Then, it standard to assert that a < 2a . Hence, over-advertising by the retailers is a result of the competition for the market they create. 5 So the manufacturer bene…ts from the retailers competing since more advertising is being spent than if there was just one retailer. Note that under a monopoly speci…cation, the only function advertising serves is generic, i.e., it expands the market. By introducing competition, the function of advertising also includes brand advertising, which increases total expenditures, but has a second-order e¤ect of expanding the market further.
Asymmetric Retailers
We now examine when the retailers di¤er in their e¤ectiveness of advertising and each retailer knows the other retailer's ability di¤erence. This asymmetry may arise from spatial di¤erences between stores or from operating in a di¤erent sales environment. 6 That is, the retailer's ad-vertising increases the total market, or awareness, of the product, but is not as e¤ective in attracting that market to their own store. We de…ne the relative e¤ectiveness, r = between retailers. This could also be driven by an historically developed characteristic such as di¤erences in brand equity between the retailers. 7 Because the e¤ectiveness parameter directly impacts the ability to capture market share, market share of the weaker retailer is is now given by ra W = (ra W + a S ), and its pro…t function is
Retailer W 's …rst-order condition for pro…t maximization is
Notice the …rst term, the market share e¤ect, and the second term, the market size e¤ect, are both decreasing as r decreases. This decline in the marginal bene…t to the weaker retailer leads to a reduction in his own advertising. The second-order condition for pro…t maximization is
and is satisi…ed only when r > a v(a ) . Note that if both retailers advertise the same amount the market share e¤ect of retailer a W becomes smaller as the asymmetry between the two retailers increases, (i.e., as r decreases).
asymmetry based on market share alone and is exogenous, whereas market share is endogenous to advertising in the current paper. 7 An empirical method for calculating r is by taking the ratio of advertising to sales and then take the ratio of ratios. For instance, if bW and bS are the advertising to sales ratios of retailer W and S, respectively, and
. Similarly, r can also represent the ratio the retailers'brand equities.
Retailer S's pro…t function is
and for …rst-order condition for pro…t maximization is
Here, the market share e¤ect is still decreasing as r gets smaller, but the market size e¤ect is increasing. When a W = 0, the solution that satis…es Equation (9) Proof of Proposition 1 is in the appendix. The results of Proposition 1 indicate that when the asymmetry between the two retailers becomes su¢ ciently large the weaker retailer does not compete, and the stronger retailer, being the only retailer in the market, will advertise at the monopoly level a S = a as illustrated in Figure 1 . 8 This is consistent with Bass et al. (2005) where, as retailers become more asymmetric, total generic advertising increases converging to the most pro…table amount for the industry (i.e., only one retailer advertises). 9 This asymmetry increases total retailer pro…ts due to less competition. From the manufacturer's perspective, however, total advertising is suboptimal due to lower sales and smaller pro…ts.
Note that when r a v(a ) the weaker retailer no longer advertises. That is, when the advertising e¤ectiveness of the strong retailer is su¢ ciently greater than the weaker retailer's e¤ectiveness, his best response is to advertise a S = a . Retailer W 's equilibrium advertising decreases as the retailers become more asymmetric. The advertising of the strong retailer, on the other hand, initially increases, then decreases as the asymmetry becomes great. The net e¤ect of these two changes is a decrease in total advertising by the retailers.
The decrease in total advertising clearly lowers the overall demand for the product. However, pro…ts to the strong retailer are increasing faster than the weaker retailer's pro…ts are decreasing, and total pro…ts converge to the monopoly case. This is attributed to the stronger retailer's market share strictly increasing as the retailers become more asymmetric. As a result, the stronger retailer's advertising functions mainly to increase market size (i.e., generic advertising) rather than competing for market share. The weaker retailer's incentive to compete diminishes as its own advertising becomes less e¤ective in gaining market share. Any market expansion from its advertising is extracted by the stronger retailer overwhelming the weaker retailer by its dominant marketing e¤ectiveness.
Manufacturer Advertising
What are the strategic responses of the retailers when the manufacturer engages in its own ad campaign? In standard contests, there is a …xed prize that is competed for through e¤ort. I consider an initially …xed prize and is still endogenous to the players'e¤ors. The manufacturer chooses an advertising amount a M in the …rst stage. The retailers, observing a M , simultaneously choose their own advertising expenditures. 10 Since yhe market size follows the same production function in Section 2.1, clear bene…t to the manufacturer is that an increase in her own advertising increases sales. However, it is not clear how the retailers would change their own advertising policies. By intuition, the manufacturer's increase in advertising would cause the retailers to cut back on their own advertising, essentially free-riding on the success of her ad campaign. On the other hand, the retailers may increase their advertising to gain a larger market share of a larger market. Using a symmetric Nash Equilibrium solution concept, the retailers'advertising expenditures would increase due to an increase in the valuation of the market, and leads to the following proposition. 
expenditures. It follows that any increase in retailer advertising is driven by maintaining market
share of a larger market size. Clearly, the competition between the retailers prevents them from free-riding on the manufacturer's advertising.
What then is the manufacturer's advertising decision when retailers are asymmetric? It becomes problematic for the manufacturer as asymmetry increases, total retailer advertising decreases, since this leads to less sales. I have shown that total retailer advertising decreases as relative advertising e¤ectiveness decreases. The proactive response by the manufacturer might be to engage in its own advertising campaign, but retailer asymmetry a¤ects their response.
At r a v(a ) only the strong retailer advertises at a S = a , but both retailers'equilibrium advertising expenditures increase with an increase in manufacturer's advertising. This follows directly from Proposition 2 and is shown analytically in the appendix. So it is clear that at the asymmetry threshold, when the stronger retailer is advertising and the weaker retailer is indi¤erent, equilibrium e¤orts for both retailers are increasing in the manufacturer's advertising.
Increasing the size of the market increases the retailers' incentives to advertise more to gain market share. Since, both retailers are already advertising, any manufacturer advertising will lead to increased total retailer advertising in equilibrium. The following proposition highlights the impact of the manufacturer's advertising decision on retailer advertising. Proof of Proposition 3 is in the appendix. It is therefore in the interest of the manufacturer to advertise when retailers are not su¢ ciently di¤erent in advertising e¤ectiveness for r > a v(a ) . This crowding-in e¤ect enhances the return on advertising to the manufacturer in the form of increased sales. When retailers are su¢ ciently asymmetric (i.e., r a v(a ) ), however, manufacturer advertising crowds-out the stronger retailer's advertising. Since the stronger retailer is a monopolist, the gains from extra advertising would be unrivaled. In fact, the stronger retailer already advertises at the pro…t maximizing level. Therefore, any increase in manufacturer advertising would cause the stronger retailer to respond by decreasing its own advertising dollar for dollar, that is, their advertising would be perfect substitutes. From Equation (9), v 0 < 1 when a S = a , a W = 0, and a M > 0. Since this is less than the marginal cost of advertising for retailer a S , the monopoly spending a S = a is no longer optimal for a M > 0.
However, only small levels of manufacturer advertising crowds-out retailer advertising. Suppose the manufacturer decides to advertise more than the monopoly allocation of advertising.
Then, the optimal amount of advertising for the dominant retailer decreases to zero, leading to full free-riding. But then the weaker retailer only has to advertise a small amount to grab the entire market. The stronger retailer, anticipating this, also advertises, etc. The stronger retailer still wants to advertise so as not to lose market share to the weaker retailer. In a competitive setting, high manufacturer advertising does not completely crowd-out the retailer's advertising.
Therefore, the crowding-out e¤ect reverses when the manufacturer's advertising is su¢ ciently large.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is that the manufacturer reduces the marginal bene…t of advertising to the retailer below marginal cost, thereby causing him to reduce total advertising.
As a result, the manufacturer's advertising crowds-out the stronger retailer's advertising and leads to complete free-riding on the manufacturer.There are two e¤ects at work. The …rst e¤ect results from the strong retailer cutting back on advertising to free ride on the manufacturer's advertising as previously described. This free-riding e¤ect increases the pro…ts of retailer S. The second e¤ect stems from the stronger retailer wanting to maintain a pro…table market share. The manufacturer's advertising eventually becomes large enough such that both retailers'advertising expenditures are increasing in a M . The threshold amount of manufacturer advertising that reverses the crowding-out e¤ect is
and is shown in the proof of Proposition 3. The optimal advertising expenditures of the retailers for any a M > a M , therefore, is critical to the manufacturer's decision to advertise. At this point, retailers will increase their advertising to compete for market share of the expanded market just as was shown in the symmetric case. Figure 2 shows that for a given r when a M < a M , the marginal impact of advertising crowds-out retailer advertising and when a M > a M the marginal impact of advertising crowds-in retailer advertising. Recall when the retailers are symmetric in advertising e¤ectiveness and the manufacturer advertises nothing, retailer advertising is a = a W = a S . As shown in this section, when the manufacturer does advertise total retailer advertising increases. On the other hand, when the retailers are perfectly asymmetric, r = 0, total retailer advertising is crowded-out for all manufacturer advertising. Since the weak retailer is no longer competing in the market, retailer S free-rides on the market expansion. As noted in Proposition 3, when retailers are su¢ ciently asymmetric, the weaker retailer may or may not advertise depending on the value of a M . This under-advertising is less pro…table to the manufacturer. If the manufacturer commits to only a modest marketing campaign, the stronger retailer's advertising is crowded-out. In this case, the manufacturer is better o¤ doing nothing, relying only on the dominant retailer's advertising. On the other hand, for a signi…cantly large marketing campaign by the manufacturer, the crowding-out e¤ect is reversed. By sweetening the pot the manufacturer entices both the strong and weak retailers to compete for market share, leading to crowding-in e¤ect of total retailer advertising.
The manufacturer must decide the most cost-e¤ective method of increasing market demand given retailer asymmetry in marketing e¤ectiveness. If retailers are su¢ ciently similar in their marketing e¤ectiveness, I …nd that the main e¤ect of manufacturer advertising intensi…es market share competition, leading to higher total retailer advertising. From the perspective of retailers, such advertising aggravates the problem of over-advertising as each retailer tries to grab a larger market share. From the perspective of the manufacturer, such advertising has a doubly positive e¤ect on market size; both a direct e¤ect from its own advertising and a crowding-in e¤ect as retailers respond to the larger market by increasing their own advertising.
Modeling the contest prize as endogenous to asymmetric player e¤orts is currently not addressed in the contest literature and extends Chung's (1996) endogenous prize analysis with symmetric players. Since the weaker player drops out when the contest is su¢ ciently asymmetric, I also introduce a contest designer's e¤ort in the …rst stage that establishes an initial prize. Even with a boost to productive e¤ort, it is still possible where the weaker player does not compete. A signi…cant increase in the value of the prize, however, induces both players to increase e¤ort. This changes the players'equilibrium e¤orts in the second stage. Solving for the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium over a range of retailer asymmetry for given manufacturer marketing e¤ort contributes to the contest literature more generally.
These results can be applied to several other competitive environments more generally. For example, in patent races, …rms collective research leads to more valuable products, request for proposals only have one bidder, only one candidate runs for political o¢ ce, and a single employee is considered for promotion. These can partially be explained by the asymmetric nature of the contest and an endogenously determined prize. Furthermore, a possible policy of outside funding, similar to Fu and Lu (2010) , is brought forth as a viable solution to the underfunding of the competition in terms of overall prize value.
There are a few natural extensions to this paper. First, other types of retailer asymmetry can also be considered, e.g., di¤ering advertising costs, or even di¤erent pro…t margins. Although costs are just a variation of ability asymmetry, di¤erences in valuation can also arise based on di¤erent pro…t margins and information about product demand. This should not qualitatively a¤ect the results, but rather increase the threshold where the weaker player stops competing.
Adding asymmetry in the market size function would have a similar e¤ect. Secondly, identifying parameter conditions of the manufacturer's payo¤ function for advertising goes beyond the scope of this paper, but would provide guidelines for more precise decision making. This would make full use of a Stackelberg Equilibrium solution concept, but would be more sensitive the payo¤ function parameters. Generally, we would expect the manufacturer to advertise more if relative costs are lower, regardless of symmetry, and advertise less if relative costs are higher than the retailers. Finally, cooperation between the retailers through the formation of ad groups could be explored in the presence of retailer asymmetry. In addition, the decision to use cooperative advertising by the manufacturer in this model structure would give further insight into its use. Proof of Lemma 1 For analytical tractibility, I borrow from Chung (1996) the speci…c functional form characterizing the endogenous prize takes the form
where > 0.
Part 1 : I …rst show existence. Let v take the functional form as in Equation 11 . The …rst derivative with respect to a i is written as:
The second derivative with respect to a i is simply:
An equilibrium exists if the payo¤ function is concave. Retailer W 's pro…t function from Equation (5):
where a W , a S , and a M are the actions taken by retailer W , retailer S, and the manufacturer, respectively and are in the set a W ; a S ; a M 2 [0; 1]. Recall that r 2 [0; 1] is the relative marketing e¤ectiveness of the weaker retailer. The …rst partial derivative for retailer W can be written as:
and is increasing. The second partial derivative is written as:
Since the third term is always negative, the …rst two terms are shown to be negative when
which is true when r > 1 2 . Note that it can still be negative for r < 1=2 when a M is su¢ ciently large. Retailer W 's cross partial is:
Evaluating retailers S's pro…t function:
and its …rst partial derivative:
and its second partial derivative:
Looking only at the …rst two terms to determine sign since third term is always negative we get:
which is true for all r 1. Retailer S's cross partial is:
Part 2: Next I show the uniqueness of an equilibrium under retailer asymmetry with manufacturer intervention. According to the Gale-Nikaido Theorem (1965) , and similar to Rosen (1965) , if the Jacobian of …rst-order conditions of the payo¤ functions is negative quasi-de…nite for all actions, then the equilibrium that simultaneously solves the …rst order conditions, if one exists, is the unique equilibrium. The Jacobian matrix is written as: 
is satis…ed for all r 1 2 , 0, and for all a W ; a S ; a M 0. Hence, there exists a unique equilibrium.
Lemma 2 For any given functional form, there exists an ability symmetry, r, such that the weaker player does not exert e¤ort and strong player exert positive e¤ort.
Proof of Lemma 2
The pro…t function of the weaker player in Equation (5) is negative if:
There exists an a S = a such that v ( a) a = 0. By Equation (11), for any a S < a the inequality v (a S ) < v ( a) holds. Since a S < a, then for any a S there exists some 0 < r < 1 such that a = a S =r and:
and that for any r r :
Rearranging, we get
Since the a S = a in the monopoly case.
Proof of Proposition 1 part (i)
The equilibrium advertising levels that simultaneously solve for the …rst-order conditions for pro…t maximization are positive for r > 1 2 and satisfy the second-order conditions. By Lemma 1 this is the unique equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1 part (ii)
To show that the equilibrium is unique, I simultaneously solve for the retailers' …rst order conditions from Equations (6) and (9) . The relationship reduces to:
which has no internal solution when r < 
Proof of Proposition 2
Part 1 Comparative statics ( r = 1): The …rst part looks at the e¤ect of manufacturer advertising on the symmetric equilibrium expenditures of the retailers. Evaluating at the symmetric equilibrium, a = a S = a W , comparative statics for retailer a W are:
which is positive if and only if:
By symmetry, this is identical to
. Next, using Equation (11) as the speci…cation for v and letting = 2, we obtain:
and
Similarly for retailer S:
if and only if a 2 S > ra 2 W in equilibrium. 
For retailer S, using Equation (9), the following partial derivatives are calculated:
Substituting these values into Equation (34) > 0 meaning that an increase in manufacturer advertising will cause an increase in both retailers'advertising at the threshold for r = 1 2 .
Proof of Proposition 3 part (i)
By Lemma 1, there exists a unique equilibrium for all a M 0.
Proof of Proposition 3 part (ii)
Part 1 Su¢ ciently low manufacturer advertising: For low values of r, only the strong retailer advertises at the monopoly allocation, a S = 2 =4. Suppose the manufacturer advertises, then the payo¤ function to the strong retailer is simply:
its …rst order condition for pro…tability is:
yielding its explicit reaction function as:
and the cross partial is:
implying that the manufacturer's advertising crowds-out the stronger retailer's advertising.
Part 2a (existence) Su¢ ciently high manufacturer advertising: From Equation (45), when the manufacturer advertises a M > 0, retailer S's best response is a S = 2 =4 a M . However, as a M increases to 2 =4, 2 =4 a M goes to 0. From Equation (26) there is a minimum a S that dissuades the weaker retailer from actively advertising in this market. Inserting a M into Equation (26) and representing v (a S ) as in Equation (11):
and solving for a S :
This condition is met when a M = 0 and r 
At this point, a S > 2 =4 a M for all a M > a M and a S = 2 =4 a M for all a M < a M . That is, any additional manufacturer advertising above a M will not reduce the stronger retailer's advertising any further, but actually increase it. This is shown in part 2c of the proof of Proposition 2.
Uniqueness:
Setting the …rst order conditions equal to each other reduces to:
When a M = 0 and r 
